Atlantic Council – A worldwide technique to safe UAS provide chains – sUAS Information – The Enterprise of Drones

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The proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) has revolutionized various industries, from agriculture to filmmaking. As the technology continues to evolve, so too do the techniques and regulations surrounding their use. This foreword explores a US-centric approach to UAV operations, highlighting best practices for safe and effective flight.

The United States has a long history as a leading innovator, enabling the country to rapidly adopt emerging technologies and bolster national security. In the realm of aviation, this adage has consistently held true. Since Orville and Wilbur Wright’s pioneering achievement in powered flight at Kitty Hawk, the United States has consistently prioritized maintaining air superiority as a vital component of its defense strategy, evolving from early Cold War-era deterrence to contemporary strategic competitions.

The People’s Republic of China has taken a commanding lead in the development and application of small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), with a significant gap emerging between itself and other nations. China’s firms have exploited the Communist Party’s unfair business practices to become dominant players in the global UAV market, valued at $31 billion as of 2023.

The Chinese language’s ascendancy in the global drone industry poses a plethora of national security concerns for the United States. In modern warfare, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones have become indispensable assets on the battlefield, providing critical support through their ability to gather real-time intelligence, conduct surveillance, and execute precision strikes with unparalleled efficiency and accuracy. The integration of Chinese languages into unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) grants the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) a strategic advantage on the battlefield, enhancing its operational capabilities and facilitating seamless communication.

Across residential settings, these devices provide critical support to law-enforcement agencies and various government entities, serving key functions in everything from conducting infrastructure inspections to playing vital parts in scientific research. China-based business drones operating in America and allied nations potentially provide the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with a means to acquire sensitive information and leverage infrastructure, which can be exploited to identify and capitalize on vulnerabilities within US and allied countries’ territories?

Chinese-language UAVs heighten concerns over human rights, as they enable surveillance of Chinese residents and further perpetuate the Communist Party’s (CCP) mistreatment of its Muslim Uyghur minority, thereby exacerbating existing human rights issues.

Washington has started to confront the challenges posed by China’s increasing dominance in the global unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) market. Federal agencies and some state governments have prohibited the use of Chinese-made drones due to security concerns. The federal government has imposed tariffs. Recognising the substantial potential benefits that Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) could bring to both protection and deterrence strategies, the Defense Department’s Division of Defence launched the Replicator initiative – a flagship programme designed to promote the development and deployment of autonomous technologies in this critical area. The US Congress has recently enacted legislation featuring novel provisions designed to safeguard American markets against Chinese drones and foster domestic drone production.

Despite these being decent initial moves, they have so far unfolded in a disjointed manner, without a clear overarching vision to guide their implementation.

A temporary proposal presents a comprehensive three-pronged “protect-promote-align” technique for America and its allies to safeguard national security interests in the global unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) market. The argument proposes that America and its allies should impose fresh regulations governing the entry of Chinese-made drones into their respective markets. U.S. drone manufacturers, along with their trusted international partners, are poised to showcase their innovative products at a series of upcoming events across America. Will they need to harmonize their insurance frameworks to support a comprehensive global approach to outmaneuver international drone rivals?

If implemented, this approach has the potential to effectively safeguard America and its allies by ensuring domestic security, deterring hostile actors, and leveraging a burgeoning technology expected to play a pivotal role in 21st-century defense, thereby fostering a more secure and prosperous future.

Deborah Lee James
Atlantic Council Board Director
Former Secretary of the Air Force

Government abstract

Since Thomas Edison’s era, America has consistently led the global innovation charge, thereby conferring substantial economic, military, and geostrategic benefits on itself and its allies. As China seeks to supplant the US as the global leader in the most advanced technologies of the 21st century, including artificial intelligence, quantum computing, hypersonic missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones. By employing a broad spectrum of unfair commercial tactics, coupled with significant intellectual property theft, China has not only bridged the gap but maintained its lead in key technologies such as UAS.

While America maintains a stronghold on large-scale military drone technology, China has emerged as a leader in the global market for smaller, commercially available drones that serve both civilian and military purposes. In a significant dominance, China commands a staggering 90% share of the American drone market, while its global reach extends to an impressive 80%.

As China’s dominance in the global UAS market poses significant homeland security risks to the United States and its partner nations? Chinese language-origin drones operating within the US and its democratic allies pose an intelligence vulnerability, as these aerial collectors gather delicate data that might be transmitted again to Beijing for a variety of nationwide safety functions, together with the Chinese language Folks’s Liberation Military (PLA) concentrating on vital infrastructure for cyber and kinetic army assaults.

China’s burgeoning drone-manufacturing capabilities grant its military a significant strategic advantage. Russia’s ongoing conflict in Ukraine starkly illustrates the increasing significance of low-cost unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in modern warfare, particularly for intelligence gathering, surveillance, reconnaissance, and precision strikes in the 21st century.

The free world also faces a significant supply-chain vulnerability issue, as its reliance on an autocratic adversary creates harmful dependencies that could be exploited by China in times of crisis or peace, threatening both civilian and military operations. Countries are increasingly employing “drone diplomacy” to make a lasting impact abroad. China’s aggressive promotion of drones, facilitated by state-subsidized low costs, effectively crowds out domestic drone industries in the United States and among its allies?

Chinese language-built drones pose a threat to democratic values and human rights, as they are exploited by authoritarian regimes like China’s Communist Party (CCP) and others for mass surveillance, exemplified in the CCP’s persecution of the Uyghur minority.

To counter the growing concerns posed by Chinese-language equipped drones, the US and its partners seek to develop innovative strategies to safeguard against these emerging threats, solidify their position in the global unmanned aerial systems (UAS) market, and maintain leadership in this pivotal technology of the 21st century. To aid America’s technological advancement and bolster global partnerships, the Scowcroft Institute has devised a three-pronged strategy: “Promote,” “Defend,” and “Coordinate.” This paper revises and applies a theoretical framework to address the complex issue of dual-use drones.

Firstly, America and its allies should take proactive measures to safeguard their national security by restricting the use of Chinese-made drones in sensitive areas, including government facilities and critical infrastructure, thereby mitigating potential risks to their nations’ safety and interests.

Particular suggestions embrace the next.

• The U.S. Congress should promptly pass the Countering CCP Drones Act and the Drone Infrastructure Inspection Grant (DIIG) Act.
• To enhance public safety and streamline implementation, the US Congress should enact legislation making state-level gun ban laws efficient and actionable by providing necessary federal support, including targeted grants that facilitate a seamless transition to effective and successful programs.
• In light of escalating global restrictions on People’s Republic of China (PRC)-manufactured drones, the US State Department should consider launching a program to educate allies and partners on the risks associated with these technologies, and facilitate the development of secure and effective alternatives.
• The US State Department should urge its international partners to impose tariffs and sanctions on Chinese-made unmanned aerial systems (UAS), a move designed to counter Beijing’s unfair trade policies.

Secondly, America and its allies should foster the development of homegrown drone manufacturing capabilities, thereby providing a secure alternative to China-made drones.

Particular suggestions embrace the next.

• US federal authorities should provide targeted grants to accelerate the adoption of secure drones in government and critical infrastructure sectors, and consider allocating funds to boost domestic drone production.
• The US State Department should urge allied governments to take similar steps, providing affordable financing mechanisms to accelerate the shift towards secure US and allied alternatives.
• The US Congress and Department of Defense should ensure the Replicator initiative receives adequate funding and support to achieve its ambitious goals as outlined in the program.
• The US Departments of State and Defense should collaborate with trusted partners to develop their own versions of the Replicator initiative, ensuring a global proliferation of UAS as a deterrent against aggression and to promote a safer international environment.
• The US Congress should enact legislation, leveraging a public-private partnership framework, to incentivize investment in the research and development of autonomous drones, while also scaling up existing UAS-manufacturing capacities within the United States.

Lastly, America should synchronize its efforts with allies and partners to develop a unified, free-world approach for regulating UAS business operations, establishing harmonized policies, rules, and standards that ensure a level playing field.

Particular suggestions embrace the next.

• The U.S. State Department should enhance its expertise and business diplomacy efforts by appointing a dedicated official to spearhead cooperative initiatives with allies on drone-related issues, including policy development, manufacturing partnerships, and secure supply chain management.
• The United States and its international partners should leverage existing multilateral frameworks, such as the US-EU Trade and Technology Council, the G7, G20, Quad, Department of Commerce, and World Trade Organization, to establish common guidelines and standards for the responsible deployment of drones and autonomous technologies.
• The United States should capitalize on the existing frameworks of NATO’s Cyber Defence Pledge and the AUKUS Enhanced Cooperation Agreement’s Pillar II, which focuses on defence capabilities, to strengthen protection coordination regarding unmanned aerial systems (UAS).

Pursuing this innovative strategy will help America and its allies maintain their technological superiority, thereby prevailing in the emerging era of intense competition with revisionist authoritarian regimes.

The Risks Associated with China’s Dominance in the Global Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Industry?

By 2023, the global unmanned aerial systems (UAS) market had reached a value exceeding projections, with forecasts suggesting it will surpass $55 billion by 2030. The drone industry is dominated by Chinese-based corporations, with DJI holding an impressive 80 percent share of the US market and up to 70 percent of the global market, while Autel, another prominent PRC producer, controls approximately 7 percent globally. As of 2021, Autel is estimated to hold a 15% market share in the US drone industry. Compared to its peers, Skydio, likely the most renowned US-based company, held a 3% market share globally, mirroring that of Parrot, its French counterpart.

The industrial drone model market share by nation of origin is primarily dominated by China, accounting for approximately 55% of the total market share. This is largely due to the country’s significant manufacturing capabilities and extensive experience in producing drones for various applications.

By the end of 2020, nearly 90% of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) used by US public-safety organizations were provided by DJI, but this dominance has since eroded due to a series of state and local bans implemented over time. Prior to the most recent ban in Florida, more than 1,800 out of a total of approximately 3,000 drones registered with the federal government and local law enforcement agencies were manufactured by DJI and Autel. Despite this, DJI and Autel still command a significant market presence among government agencies in certain regions. According to the data, more than 90% of the approximately 500 unmanned aerial systems (UAS) registered with the state of New Jersey and its law enforcement agencies were manufactured by either DJI or Autel.

Despite concerns over their reliability and security, US allies continue to heavily rely on Chinese-manufactured unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In the United Kingdom, a staggering 68% of the 337 drones utilised by police forces nationwide are manufactured by DJI. Despite reports suggesting that thousands of DJI drones were owned by federal companies in Australia, the Australian Army had already grounded its operations, while other firms had started to distance themselves from these devices as well.

The unchecked global supremacy of DJI and Autel owes a significant debt to the nationwide Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) initiatives, including the “Made in China 2025” and “Navy-Civil Fusion” strategies, which have been partly enabled by industrial and corporate theft of international expertise. While the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has made significant strides towards a market-oriented economy, it remains far from being a pure market economic system. As an alternative, it advocates for a non-competitive system of commerce, supported by fair market practices rather than relying on subsidies or other unfair advantages.

Launched in 2015, Made in China 2025 is an initiative aimed at revitalizing the country’s manufacturing prowess across multiple sectors. The plan encompasses development across ten distinct sectors, in addition to the emergence of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). By 2025, the Chinese government aims to enhance its domestic manufacturing capabilities by having at least 70 percent of core components and materials produced within the country, across all sectors. To realize this objective, the PRC  a wide range of ways, comparable to creating monetary and tax incentives to persuade foreign-based corporations to shift manufacturing and analysis and growth (R&D) operations to China, intellectual-property theft, predatory procurement insurance policies, and financing state-owned enterprises of their acquisitions of abroad firms.

Navy-Civil Fusion, a key component of President Xi Jinping’s strategic vision, aims to enable China to modernize its military by 2035 and ultimately transform the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a “world-class” force by 2049. At its core, MCF is a technique that goals to interrupt down limitations between business R&D and army merchandise, permitting the PLA to quickly determine, undertake, scale up, and leverage business applied sciences that even have a army software, comparable to UAS.

The MCF system fosters linkages between the state and numerous private companies that can support military operations and fulfill procurement requirements, including entities that develop unmanned technologies. To achieve its goals, the PRC employed a range of strategies, including legal and illegal means, leveraging global educational exchanges, investing in international companies, and making forced military transitions, as well as, in certain cases, outright theft.

Due to these tactics, DJI and Autel are able to sell their UAS at prices below market value to America and allied nations, a practice commonly referred to as dumping? In 2017, a US Department of Homeland Security investigation revealed that in 2015, DJI had slashed its prices by 70%, leading to concerns highlighted in 2019 by then Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord, who noted, “We don’t have much of a UAS industrial base because DJI flooded the market with low-cost quadcopters, and we subsequently relied on them.” Moreover, DJI’s connections to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) go far beyond state support for illicit trade practices. In 2022, an investigation revealed that four distinct investment vehicles controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had collectively invested in DJI, a prominent drone manufacturer.

The US authorities acknowledge the risks posed by Chinese-manufactured drones. In 2021, the Division of Protection announced that DJI technologies pose potential threats to national security. In 2022, DJI operated as a Chinese drone manufacturer with a significant presence in the American market. The Treasury Department is expected to add Chinese naval-industrial complex companies to its list of entities subject to US investment restrictions, effectively prohibiting American citizens from trading in or acquiring shares of these publicly listed firms if they attempt to go public through the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTC).

The proliferation of PRC-made unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in the national airspace poses four pressing concerns regarding their impact on aviation safety across the country. Can the United States effectively detect and monitor Chinese language-based intelligence activities on its soil? In early 2024, CISA and the FBI issued an alert warning that using Chinese-made drones in critical infrastructure operations poses a significant risk: it could expose sensitive information to PRC authorities, potentially putting US interests at jeopardy? Nationwide safety, financial security, and public wellbeing and security are key concerns reflected in the joint CISA-FBI alert, while China’s 2017 Nationwide Intelligence Regulation further complicates matters by requiring private companies to collaborate with the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) intelligence agencies. Article 14 of the legislation stipulates that state intelligence organs can demand assistance, help, and cooperation from involved entities when conducting lawful intelligence operations. In practice, this may lead to Chinese language drone companies sharing sensitive flight data, customer private information, geolocation data, images, and videos collected in the United States with the CCP? By transferring control of this critical information to Beijing, China would gain the ability to identify and leverage the United States’ weaknesses, thereby empowering Chinese efforts to compromise, disrupt, or dismantle American infrastructure during times of crisis or conflict. In 2017, reports emerged that US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had allegedly raised concerns with China’s DJI, suggesting that the company might be providing Beijing with sensitive information about critical US infrastructure sites, potentially enabling the Chinese government to pinpoint specific properties. FBI Director Christopher Wray emphasized that China’s cybersecurity firms pose a “broad and relentless threat” to the United States’ critical infrastructure, warning they are capable of causing significant harm. Moreover, PRC-manufactured UAS have been detected in restricted airspace, including over Washington, D.C. Regardless of DJI’s implementation of geofencing restrictions, which in principle aim to restrict the areas where their UAS can operate.

The second concern centers on the military’s overall capability and readiness. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has emerged as a proving ground for innovative military technologies, with small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) serving as a game-changer on the battlefield. Troops on the ground are enabled to conduct real-time, high-fidelity intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) of enemy positions and movements, thereby facilitating more effective and timely fires support. While unmanned aerial systems (UAS) have also been proven to be a cost-effective and efficient means of striking targets, they are capable of destroying more expensive platforms by physically colliding with them or deploying inexpensive munitions. Chinese-language equipped drones significantly enhance Vladimir Putin’s military arsenal, rendering his conflict capabilities even more formidable. As of March 2023, China held a significant stockpile of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and their components valued at more than $12 million, destined for Russia. The consistent provision of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) has granted Russia entry to a cost-effective and abundant means of conducting Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), as well as precision strikes. DJI and Autel are the leading drone manufacturers that supply China to Russia? To effectively maintain deterrence in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific regions, America and its allies will likely seek the flexibility to develop robust, trusted unmanned aerial systems (UAS) at scale, capable of fulfilling various military roles while countering adversaries’ drone threats. Recent developments from China underscore the growing importance of this situation. Last year, China imposed export controls on small commercial drones for the first time. These measures aim to restrict Ukraine’s primary source of drones without compromising supplies to Russia. As global demand for energy continues to surge, the need for diverse supply chains becomes increasingly urgent?

A third concern relates to the reliability of supply chains, ensuring uninterrupted and secure delivery of essential goods. Recently, America and its allies have come to realize that their economic reliance on autocratic powers such as China and Russia has left them vulnerable due to a lack of diversification in the supply chain, particularly when it comes to essential goods like semiconductors, critical minerals, energy, and more. The People’s Republic of China has showcased its capacity to restrict US and allied access to Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) by impeding Ukraine’s supplies, implying that it could potentially curtail such entry during times of war? Equally, US-based drone operators are exempt from federal and state restrictions on Chinese-made drones, just like commercial entities, vulnerable to the People’s Republic of China’s capacity to restrict their access to UAS for civilian purposes in times of peace?

The final consideration relates directly to human dignity and fundamental freedoms. China has been accused of perpetrating egregious human rights abuses and committing acts of genocide against its Uyghur minority population. Under the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020, the United States has committed to imposing sanctions on companies complicit in human rights abuses perpetrated against the Uyghur minority. According to a statement from the US Treasury Department, SZ DJI, a Chinese drone manufacturer, is accused of providing surveillance equipment to the Xinjiang Public Safety Bureau, which has been instrumental in monitoring and detaining the Uyghur minority population in Xinjiang. The Xinjiang Public Safety Bureau was previously sanctioned in July 2020 by the US government for its alleged connection to human rights abuses in Xinjiang, as required by the International Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. DJI has already been listed as an entity by the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security, effectively restricting US companies’ ability to supply technology and components to DJI. As allegations persist that DJI facilitates surveillance technology for the Chinese government’s mass detentions of Uyghurs, it is clear that Beijing’s influence on authoritarian regimes worldwide is a pressing concern. China and its authoritarian allies increasingly employ unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to quash democracy and human rights worldwide. Ensuring a diverse range of drone manufacturers exists to counterbalance China’s dominance in the unmanned aerial systems (UAS) market is crucial for promoting democratic values worldwide, as it would limit the ability of authoritarian regimes to exploit this technology to suppress dissent and undermine human rights.

Countermeasures against People’s Republic of China-manufactured unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), a growing concern for global security.

America and its allies have already taken steps to counteract China’s dominance in unmanned aerial systems (UAS). The Trump administration’s decision to allow the sale of US drone technology to China-based company DJI without obtaining a required license raised concerns about national security implications on the federal stage. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Division of Protection, along with the Division of Homeland Safety and the Division of the Interior, utilized Chinese-made drones in 2018, 2019, and 2020, respectively. Congress  the Pentagon’s ban in 2019. The 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) imposes significant restrictions by prohibiting the Department of Defense (DOD) from acquiring unmanned aerial systems (UAS) or components originating from Russia, Iran, and North Korea. The legislation prohibits defense contractors from employing unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and components manufactured in China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea to fulfill Department of Defense (DOD) contracts starting in 2023. The American Safety Drone Act, included in the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), prohibits federal authorities from acquiring and operating unmanned aerial systems (UAS) from designated hostile nations, including China. The act also bars the use of federal funds to purchase or operate such drones starting in December 2025.

In the realm of state-level drone usage, Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Mississippi, Nevada, Texas, Tennessee, and Utah have all adopted Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) manufactured by Precision Resource Corporation (PRC), utilizing these aerial assets for state-run initiatives and projects. These restrictions typically align with federal legal standards, protecting authorities’ organizations from insecure products linked to hostile countries. The initial focus of this state motion is on restricting authorities’ use of end-user devices, but a separate section addressing grant opportunities to facilitate the shift away from vulnerable drones is still under development. Florida has allocated a $25 million grant program to aid local businesses in reducing their reliance on unsecured drones by 2023. By 2024, several state legislatures had proposed matching grant programs.

Legislative efforts to advance this approach continue to unfold in the US Congress. Representatives Elise Stefanik (R-NY) and Mike Gallagher (R-WI) introduced the Countering CCP Drones Act, which aims to amend the Safe and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019. If added to the listing of apparatus banned from working on US telecommunications infrastructure, this could likely hinder DJI’s ability to introduce new products into the market, potentially affecting their revenue streams. The proposed invoice would not impact existing DJI drone models.

To enhance US military readiness, the Department of Defense recently launched the Replicator initiative, aimed at rapidly countering China’s dominance in the domain of attritable autonomous technologies for army functions. The development of the Replicator was partially driven by China’s ability to leverage its large-scale manufacturing capabilities, enabling rapid production of advanced weapon systems and autonomous technologies. The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to deploy hundreds of autonomous systems utilizing Replicator technology. Uncertainties persist regarding the methodologies that will likely be selected for the Replicator, the funding mechanisms that will support this initiative, and the quantity of techniques that will ultimately be acquired. To decisively prevail in near-peer battles, Replicator may need to acquire and integrate hundreds of diverse tactics across multiple domains. According to a report from the UK-based Royal United Services Institute, Ukraine is allegedly losing approximately 10,000 drones every 30 days during its ongoing conflict with Russia, providing insight into the scale of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) used in modern warfare. To amplify the effectiveness of Replicator and ensure that all-domain attritable autonomous technologies have a decisive impact in near-peer conflicts, the Department of Defense should consider stockpiling unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Stockpiling such techniques provides a strategic hedge against potential supply-chain disruptions in times of conflict, allowing for swift replenishment of depleted drone supplies at the frontlines when needed most.

US allies have also begun to behave themselves. In 2022, Lithuania has begun acquiring expertise from countries previously considered “untrustworthy” for purposes related to national security and public safety, as well as integrating PRC-manufactured Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). India has banned the import of all Chinese-made drones and their component parts, effective immediately. In recent years, Australia’s military and border control agencies have incorporated DJI drones into their operations, with various entities reportedly shifting towards safer approaches. In Japan, the Coast Guard began utilizing DJI drones in 2020 as a precautionary measure due to growing concerns about cybersecurity.

As a next step, America and its partners seek a comprehensive, whole-of-free-world strategy to effectively counter the escalating threat from People’s Republic of China-manufactured drones.

Secure supply chain management for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in a free world setting necessitates the implementation of robust measures to safeguard against counterfeiting, tampering, and diversion.

To mitigate these threats, manufacturers, suppliers, and operators must adopt a holistic approach that integrates risk assessment, quality control, and authentication technologies.

The United States and its coalition partners should develop a comprehensive strategy to address the threat posed by Chinese-manufactured drones. The imperative is to mitigate and potentially eliminate the nationwide security risks stemming from an excessive dependence on People’s Republic of China-manufactured drones, while fostering a reliable alternative drone industry in trustworthy countries. To achieve these goals, the US and its partners should adopt a cohesive “Defend, Promote, and Align” strategy.

1. 

The core objective of securing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) supply chains lies in safeguarding US and allied markets against the threat posed by People’s Republic of China-manufactured drones, which compromise national security or contravene international trade laws and standards. The United States starts by rigorously disentangling itself from Chinese-made drone operations in regions of heightened national security sensitivity. The United States’ approach to regulating unmanned aerial systems (UAS) will likely follow a “small yard, big fence” strategy similar to its handling of other crucial technologies, such as semiconductors.

While the American Safety Drone Act represents a crucial initial step in addressing the matter, it falls short of providing a comprehensive solution to the problem. Moreover, it is imperative that Congress swiftly moves the Countering CCP Drones Act forward, prohibiting Chinese-made drones from operating on Federal Communications Commission (FCC) infrastructure – a measure akin to the US government’s earlier decision to restrict Chinese telecommunications companies Huawei and ZTE. Recognized by CISA and the FBI, the ongoing operation of Chinese-language UAS on US infrastructure significantly increases the risk that the PRC will gain access to sensitive information, which could be used for espionage purposes, exploiting vulnerabilities in US critical infrastructure and public-safety response networks, and staging potential cyberattacks. The discovery of Volt Storm, a newly uncovered Chinese threat campaign targeting US critical infrastructure, underscores the alarming extent of cyber threats. The proposed American Safety Drone Act would initially target DJI exclusively, but its scope needs to be broadened to encompass all unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) manufactured in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including those produced by Autel.

Restrictions on Chinese-manufactured drones intended for civilian use should be extended to all levels of government, ensuring continued safeguards for national security and public safety. The disparate nature of state and local laws has given rise to a fragmented approach, replete with inconsistencies that create openings for exploitation. The proposed ban on Chinese-language operated drones working in America should encompass all US-based personnel operating in sensitive national security domains, such as inspecting critical infrastructure sites that require elevated security clearances?

The Department of State should collaborate with US allies and partners to develop and promote similar legislation prohibiting Chinese drones from operating in sensitive sectors, and to coordinate common drone policies moving forward. The US may compromise its global security readiness and ability to execute missions effectively if China successfully gathers sensitive intelligence by deploying surveillance drones in key allied countries, potentially putting critical information at risk. The United States and its allies prioritize collaborative advancements in crucial and emerging fields through various forums, including the US-EU Commerce and Technology Council, among others. The U.S. State Department should prioritize drone technology cooperation as a major discussion topic and collaboration area within international forums. Additionally, the State Department should appoint a dedicated individual to spearhead international diplomacy on drone collaboration, ensuring seamless coordination and effective communication with foreign governments.

Additionally, America and its allies should consider implementing coordinated tariffs and other countervailing measures to offset China’s unfair trade practices and level the playing field. The United States should seriously consider increasing its existing 25% tariff on imported Chinese-made drones to protect domestic industries and national security interests. While implementing certain measures may come with a cost, this expense is frequently mitigated through the recommendations offered within the “promote” component of the strategy. Should America impose higher tariffs on Chinese-made drones, the resulting increased revenue could be allocated to fund various grant programs that support current Chinese drone users – such as law enforcement agencies – in transitioning to U.S.-made or allied drone systems.

To effectively manage trade policies, it is crucial to develop strategies to combat tariff evasion. In March 2024, a bipartisan group of lawmakers in Congress approached the Joe Biden administration with concerns that Chinese drone manufacturers were exploiting loopholes to circumvent the 25 percent tariffs by rerouting shipments through Malaysia. After exporting a mere handful of drones to America and having no prominent domestic drone manufacturers prior to 2022, Malaysia’s drone exports to the United States skyrocketed inexplicably to 242,000 units that year. Furthermore, in the first eleven months of 2023 alone, America imported more than 565,000 drones from Malaysia. It is crucially important to address transshipment and impose equal tariffs or categorical bans on companies and products found to be complicit.

As the U.S. seeks to safeguard its drone supply chain, it must exercise vigilance regarding efforts by DJI and other Chinese drone manufacturers to circumvent American sanctions. The New York Times reported earlier this year that a Texas-based company, which licenses drone designs from DJI and sources many of its components from China, serves as an example. Legislative efforts by Congress, coupled with regulatory actions from federal authorities, aim to eliminate loopholes allowing Chinese companies to circumvent penalties by channeling products through US-based entities, thereby reducing dependence on Chinese drones.

As the possibility of a catastrophic event or military conflict with China looms, Washington and its coalition partners must swiftly implement far-reaching sanctions against Chinese companies crucial to Beijing’s military and intelligence operations, including DJI and Autel. The US government should consider imposing sanctions on companies involved in the general procurement process for unmanned aerial systems (UAS), a move reminiscent of the Treasury Department’s efforts to target firms supporting Iran’s drone industry? In the event of a disaster, a robust response to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would involve implementing swift and decisive measures to limit the transfer of American technological know-how to China through retaliatory export controls. To mitigate the potential consequences of sanctions, the Sanctions Financial Evaluation Unit should thoroughly analyze the possible “collateral damage” of sanctions before they’re implemented and after they’ve taken effect to determine whether adjustments are necessary. A straightforward win in this area would be adding Autel to the Division of Defense’s 1260H listing, the Commerce Department’s entity list, and the Treasury Department’s Chinese Military-Civilian Complex Companies List, thereby joining DJI. Furthermore, America must strive to establish robust and resilient supply chains for all aspects of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), including through the development of a domestic industrial base that ensures reliability and security.

To foster effective information sharing with its global partners, the United States should utilize the newly created Office of the Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging Technologies (S/TECH) to promote collaboration and mutual understanding. The US Defense Technology Security Administration should prioritize the development of secure supply chains for unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), alongside other measures such as coordinating restrictions and safeguards on Chinese-made drones. Therefore, the Department of Defense should prioritize unmanned aerial systems (UAS) as a key focus area in all diplomatic expertise exchanges conducted by US representatives with international partners.

Collectively, these measures will furnish critical security for America and its allies by countering the threat posed by Chinese-manufactured Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS).

2. 

The second key aspect of this strategy is to showcase the capability of American and allied nations to manufacture high-quality drones, effectively broadcasting their technological prowess on the global stage. While drones have become essential in various applications, China’s dominance over the global drone market is undeniable. As the United States and its allies rapidly de-risk their reliance on Chinese-origin drones, they may consider replacing them with models manufactured by reliable partners.

Among the steps identified in the “defend” aspect of the technique is the potential to stimulate domestic and allied manufacturing in the United States. Imposed restrictions on the importation of Chinese language drones are likely to stimulate interest in alternative drone options from other manufacturers. Implementation of stricter tariffs on Chinese-made drones is likely to level the playing field and enable non-PRC-manufactured drones to become more competitive in the market.

To ensure seamless implementation of these bans with minimal disruption, federal authorities should provide targeted funding incentives that encourage a swift shift away from PRC-manufactured UAS. With Florida’s ban on PRC-made UAS devices, local authorities, including fire departments and law enforcement agencies, are frantically seeking funding alternatives to compensate for the lack of support. Federal funding availability can potentially alleviate the financial strain associated with exploring alternative solutions to People’s Republic of China Unmanned Aerial Systems (PRC UAS).

The Drone Innovation In Government (DIIG) Act provides funding for state and local entities to procure unmanned aerial systems (UAS) for infrastructure inspections. Federal funding for drone technology development should be contingent upon state-by-state prohibitions on the acquisition, possession, or operation of drones manufactured in the People’s Republic of China, with exceptions made only for legitimate national security purposes. Any government entity that exclusively prohibits the use of DJI products while permitting those from Autel or other manufacturers would not be considered for these funds.

The State Department should collaborate with international partners to promote similar initiatives, as seen in the DIIG Act, and urge allied governments to adopt comparable measures. The cornerstone of U.S. national security lies in its robust community of allies. Given this reality, the United States should incentivize its allies to adopt complementary security strategies that prioritize their own safety and stability.

As part of its Replicator initiative, the Pentagon must strategically leverage investments in autonomous technology to drive a substantial acceleration in development and deployment, ultimately elevating the nation’s capabilities in this critical area. Within a remarkably short span of 18 to 24 months, Replicator has the potential to significantly enhance the US Department of Defense’s warfighting capabilities while rapidly producing numerous cutting-edge unmanned aerial vehicles. The US Congress and Department of Defense should make a priority of providing stable, long-term financial support for the Replicator program.

The initial results attained through the Replicator will be sustained and leveraged by implementing the Workplace of Strategic Capital’s (OSC) framework. Launched in 2022, the Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) has been instrumental in identifying critical applied sciences that cater to the needs of the Department of Defense (DOD), while collaborating with private capital entities and other organizations to develop innovative investment vehicles. With Replicator’s precedence established as a symbol for division, the urgency surrounding the autonomous Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) market warrants a top-tier focus for Open Standardization Committee (OSC). Notwithstanding, the Open Science Community (OSC) funding is intended to prioritize smaller enterprises incapable of producing methods at scale, thereby enriching the Replicator database. To foster a robust unmanned aerial systems (UAS) industry, OSC should consider augmenting small, groundbreaking companies within the US supply chain, thereby supporting the development of a vital domestic industrial base capable of providing cutting-edge components for current and emerging UAS technologies. By establishing UAS as a priority area for OSC, the Division of Defense can simultaneously foster a resilient domestic production hub for this capability.

Will there be consideration for OSC funding to play a pivotal role in bolstering the domestic UAS industry, with the White House seeking $144 million for the office in 2025? In tandem with responding to the White House’s request for Office of Science and Technology (OST) funding, Congress should continue supporting various accelerators and offices that foster the growth of companies across the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 14 critical technology domains.

To bridge potential funding shortfalls, the Department of Defense (DOD) must be prepared to allocate additional funds for small unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technologies outside of existing Operating Structure Codes, while also increasing associated appropriations to relevant job forces across the Military, Navy, and Air Force branches. Therefore, it is imperative that Congress approve increased funding for the Protection Manufacturing Act, thereby empowering the Department of Defense to invest more in the defense industrial base, including the development of versatile capabilities like small drones that have proven crucial in Ukraine’s battlefield triumphs?

The US Departments of State and Homeland Security could foster cooperation with key partners to develop tailored versions of the Replicator program, thereby ensuring a global proliferation of UAS, which would be crucial for deterring and countering aggression in the 21st century? Furthermore, the Division of Protection should consider the possibility of inviting other nations and partners to join the Replicator program, or establish a multinational alliance focused on this critical technology. By fostering this integration, the division would exponentially expand the allied drone industry, establish seamless coordination among diverse military forces, and bolster the collective defense posture against major power competitors.

The Defense Department (DOD) is actively seeking to integrate Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and autonomous technologies more comprehensively across its operations. The United States Navy’s Process Drive 59 aims to integrate emerging technologies into warfighting capabilities, with a current focus on developing robotics and autonomous systems. Operates a diverse portfolio of unmanned vehicles, encompassing aerial systems (UAS), as well as underwater and surface-level vessels, including submersibles.

The Air Drive  Process Drive 99. Headquartered in Qatar, the company boasts a cutting-edge 3D-printed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), known as the “Kestrel,” priced at $2,500, with the capacity to transport payloads of up to 3 kilograms.

Despite the initial momentum generated by Process Forces 59 and 99, their progress has been hindered by bureaucratic obstacles and a lack of financial support. While comparable concerns surround the capabilities of the private sector to fulfill the federal government’s requirement for replicators. For any successful long-term strategy to thrive in this domain, a seamless collaboration must be established between the private and public spheres. The Replicator initiative sets the stage for a transformative partnership between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the defense technology industry, enabling the DOD to form a meaningful connection with the sector while breaking free from outdated Cold War-era procurement practices, thereby establishing the new defense industrial base essential for 21st-century security.

Congress should enact legislation based on the CHIPS and Science Act to facilitate the development of autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles. Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act in 2022 to address a long-standing issue in domestic semiconductor manufacturing. The act provides billions of dollars in incentives for the development, growth, and production of semiconductors. The advancements have already spurred the creation of modern semiconductor-manufacturing facilities in the United States. Similarly, the United States should offer a diverse array of inducements, including tax credits and investments, to encourage the research, development, and production of self-driving vehicles. By incentivizing US-based production of autonomous vehicles, the development of drones suitable for Department of Defense (DOD) procurement becomes more feasible, ultimately paving the way for the global commercial availability of domestically manufactured unmanned aerial systems (UAS).

Implementing a uniform set of regulations governing the production of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) would yield a significant difference compared to the CHIPS Act, primarily due to the reduced cost potential. The construction of a state-of-the-art producing facility for the production of semiconductor chips is expected to cost at least $10 billion and require a minimum of five years to complete. Skydio, a prominent US-based drone manufacturer, secured $230 million in additional funding in 2023, with a portion dedicated to constructing a state-of-the-art UAV-manufacturing facility within the United States, significantly expanding its production capacity by a factor of ten. For a fraction of the $54 billion CHIPS Act, America can efficiently develop and support a diverse array of domestic UAV-manufacturing operations.

International partners and like-minded nations have taken note of the US’s passage of the CHIPS Act, prompting them to introduce similar legislation in their own countries. The European Union has finally turned the European Chips Act into legislation in September 2023. The US-inspired alliance to invest in CHIPS may likely prompt key allies to boost domestic drone production efforts in their respective countries.

Implementing such measures demands a comprehensive global approach, necessitating close collaboration between the White House, the Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce, as well as the United States’ key allies and partners. To effectively achieve these ambitious goals, the President should consider appointing a dedicated individual within the State Department’s S/TECH office. The individual responsible for overseeing these coverage proposal initiatives would function similarly to a White House coordinator for CHIPs implementation. The designated envoy should establish specific deadlines to ensure accountability and measurable progress towards achieving these key objectives.

Together, these actions could foster the development of an industrial base in America and allied nations, ensuring a reliable and secure supply chain for Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS).

3. 

A crucial component of this technique involves developing a comprehensive, free-world strategy for establishing insurance policies, rules, and norms governing commercial Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). One of the United States’ key advantages over China lies in its extensive network of allies and partners around the world. Mixed economies, led by America and its allies, account for nearly 60% of the world’s total Gross Domestic Product (GDP), enabling them to collectively exert significant influence on shaping global outcomes.

The G7, G20, and ASEAN are all multilateral groupings that enable America to build alliances and partnerships to establish a series of reliable supply chains for semiconductors. The technology should perform identically with Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS).

The Scowcroft Institute has previously advocated that America and its allies establish a new Democratic Technology Alliance to harmonize the free world’s approach to emerging technologies, including unmanned aerial systems (UAS). It is essential that America and its allies cooperate effectively through established bilateral and multilateral frameworks.

The United States should collaborate with its international partners to establish clear guidelines and standards for the responsible utilization of emerging technologies, including unmanned aerial systems (UAS), through forums like the US-European Union Trade and Technology Council, NATO, the Group of Seven, the Group of Twenty, and the World Trade Organization. The United States can better serve its interests by developing coordinated policies with its international partners through these collaborative forums. By taking this approach, we can ensure a seamless and harmonious plan unfolds moving forward. The United States must also elevate its concerns within these international bodies regarding China’s unfair and illegal practices. While the World Trade Organization (WTO) may lack the authority to effectively address Chinese practices, examining its past decisions and trade disputes could provide valuable insights into patterns of unfair behaviour. Establishing a set of clear norms would help dispel the notion that the free world is failing to impose punitive measures on China or actively seeking to bring it down. Moderately, the United States is taking prudent measures to safeguard its interests against China’s unfair and potentially threatening business practices. If China were to reform its practices and financial system, it would likely be welcomed back into US and allied markets with open arms.

Simultaneously, the Division of Commerce and its Worldwide Commerce Administration should take a leading role in fostering a trustworthy environment – both domestically and internationally – to secure critical components necessary for bolstering domestic UAS manufacturing while promoting US-made drones globally.

Moreover, America should fully commit to the newly formed trilateral defense alliance, AUKUS.

The AUKUS Pillar II brings together Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to strengthen coordination on protecting key technologies, including artificial intelligence and autonomy, innovative solutions, and data exchange across these critical areas. The US Department of Defense should collaborate closely with its AUKUS partners to drive innovation and prioritise the development of cutting-edge unmanned aerial systems (UAS).

Washington should collaborate with its international partners to establish a secure supply chain for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components and production. The Defense Department (DOD) has successfully tested two drones from French manufacturer Parrot, deemed reliable and trustworthy through its Blue UAS initiative. The possibility of producing elemental components in countries with a proven track record of reliability will be facilitated by the outcome of our recent discussions.

NATO offers various options for Washington to synchronize efforts with its allies in advancing cutting-edge technologies. The NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) serves as a platform where Alliance member nations can harness the power of emerging technologies by convening experts from academia, industry, and government. By 2023, DIANA has identified the core three domains that will drive the development of dual-use technologies, namely? One domain where unmanned aerial systems (UAS) are likely to experience significant growth is sensing and surveillance. DIANA has successfully integrated a Czech unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) manufacturer into its system. In this critical juncture, America should leverage its partnership with NATO’s Defence Industry Association (DIANA) to foster enhanced cooperation on Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), facilitating reciprocal growth and manufacturing relationships across Europe and laying the groundwork for a dual-use drone industry.

Furthermore, America should collaborate with its partners to ensure the stability of the critical UAS supply chain, including the reliable production and procurement of high-quality batteries and battery cells. The geological exploration and assessment of a potential mineral deposit must take into account various factors, including the nature of the host rock, the presence and type of minerals, and the likelihood of economic extraction. As the global energy landscape shifts towards low-carbon alternatives, China’s dominant position in the lithium market and Russia’s significant nickel reserves pose obstacles to US attempts to secure access to critical battery minerals. Several members of the Atlantic Council’s International Vitality Hub suggest that a viable approach to addressing these challenges might be fostering research, development, and capacity-building initiatives tailored to various battery chemistries. By tapping into public financing from the US and its allies, as well as harnessing the power of tax incentives, this initiative seeks to foster a more diverse range of battery sources. By 2021, the Department of Energy’s Division of Vitality announced that advancements related to high-performance batteries, developed with taxpayer funds through DOE grants, would need to be “significantly” manufactured in America. In 2023, as a result of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, the DOE allocated $3.5 billion to boost domestic manufacturing of advanced batteries and battery materials across the country. Concurrently, federal authorities, along with state and local governments, must muster the political will to enable home mining and refining of these minerals, ensuring safe access to batteries. As regulatory hurdles are streamlined, personal investment opportunities will emerge in the burgeoning energy storage sector. Public-private partnerships are crucial for strengthening the US battery supply chain and reducing vulnerabilities in relation to China.

Collectively taken, these steps will ensure a profitable and coordinated world-wide approach to Unmanned Aerial Systems.

Conclusion

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This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the protect-promote-align technique, a vital tool for assisting America and its allies in securing a trusted Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) market that can effectively compete with China’s growing presence in the industry. China’s unchecked dominance in the dual-use unmanned aerial systems (UAS) sector poses a significant and unacceptable risk to national security across America and its allied nations. By adopting this strategic approach, the US and its partners can effectively counterbalance the CCP’s unfair trade practices that have contributed to China’s undeserved dominance in the global UAS industry. A pioneering approach, which restricts the use of PRC-made unmanned aerial systems (UAS), fosters domestic UAS manufacturing, synchronizes America with like-minded allies, and enables the free world to maintain its innovative edge over the Chinese Communist Party, ultimately positioning itself for triumph in this new era of strategic competition.

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