How did you go bankrupt?”
Two methods. Regularly, then abruptly.”
Ernest Hemingway, The Solar Additionally Rises
Each disruptive expertise because the fireplace and the wheel have pressured leaders to adapt or die. This publish tells the story of what occurred when 4,000 firms confronted a disruptive expertise and why just one survived.
Within the early twentieth century, the USA was house to greater than 4,000 carriage and wagon producers. They had been the spine of mobility and the precursors of vehicles, used for private transportation, items supply, navy logistics, public transit, and extra. These firms employed tens of hundreds of employees and shaped the center of an ecosystem of blacksmiths, wheelwrights, saddle makers, stables, and feed suppliers.
And inside 20 years, they had been gone. Only one firm out of 4,000 carriage and wagon makers pivoted to vehicles.
At the moment, this story feels uncannily acquainted. Simply because the carriage business watched the auto evolve from curiosity to dominance, fashionable firms in SaaS, media, software program, logistics, protection and training are watching AI emerge from novelty into existential risk.
A Comfy Trade Misses the Flip
In 1900, the U.S. was the worldwide chief in constructing carriages. South Bend, IN; Flint, MI; and Cincinnati, Ohio, had been filled with factories producing carriages, buggies, and wagons. On the high-end these firms made fantastically crafted automobiles, largely from wooden and leather-based, hand-built by artisans. Others had been extra fundamental wagons for hauling items.
When early vehicles started showing within the 1890’s — first steam-powered, then electrical, then gasoline –most carriage and wagon makers dismissed them. Why wouldn’t they? The primary automobiles had been:
- Loud and unreliable
- Costly and arduous to restore
- Starved for gas in a world with no fuel stations
- Unsuitable for the grime roads of rural America
Early autos had been worse on most key dimensions that mattered to clients. Clayton Christensen’s “Innovator’s Dilemma” described this completely – disruption begins with inferior merchandise that incumbents don’t take significantly. However beneath that dismissiveness was one thing deeper: id and hubris. Carriage producers noticed themselves not as transportation firms, however as craftsmen of stylish, horse-drawn automobiles. Automobiles weren’t an evolution—they had been heresy. And so, they waited. And watched. And went out of enterprise slowly after which hastily.
Early Autos Have been Area of interest and Experimental (Nineties–1905) The primary automobiles (steam, electrical, and early fuel) had been costly, unreliable, and gradual. They had been constructed by 19th century mechanical nerds. And the few that had been offered had been thought of toys for different nerds and the wealthy. (Carl Benz patented the primary inner combustion engine in 1886. In 1893 Frank Duryea drove the primary automotive within the U.S.)
These early automobiles coexisted with an enormous horse-powered economic system. Horses pulled wagons, delivered items, powered streetcars, and folks. The primary automakers used the one design they knew: the carriage. Drivers sat up excessive like they did in a carriage once they needed to see over the horses.
For the primary 15 years carriage makers, teamsters, and steady homeowners noticed no instant risk. Like AI immediately: autos had been highly effective, new, buggy, unreliable and never but mainstream.
Disruption Begins (1905–1910) 10 years after their first look, gasoline automobiles grew to become extra sensible, that they had higher engines, rubber tires, and municipalities had begun to pave roads. From 1903 to 1908 Ford shipped 9 completely different fashions of automobiles as they experimented with what we’d name immediately minimal viable merchandise. Ford (and Normal Motors) broke away from their carriage legacies and started designing automobiles from first ideas, optimized for pace, security, mass manufacturing, and fashionable supplies. That’s the second the automotive grew to become its personal species. Till then, it was nonetheless principally a carriage with a motor. City elites switched from carriages to autos for standing and pace, and taxis, supply fleets, and rich commuters adopted automobiles in main cities.
Even with proof staring them within the face, carriage firms nonetheless didn’t pivot, assuming automobiles had been a fad. For carriage firms this was the “denial and drift” section of disruption.
The Tipping Level: Ford’s Mannequin T and Mass Manufacturing (1908–1925) The Ford Mannequin T launched in 1908 was reasonably priced ($825 to as little as $260 by the Twenties), sturdy and simple to restore, and made utilizing meeting line mass manufacturing. Inside 15 years tens of tens of millions of People owned automobiles. Horse-related companies — not solely the carriage makers, however all the ecosystem of blacksmiths, stables, and feed suppliers — started collapsing. Cities banned horses from downtown areas as a result of waste, illness, and congestion. This was just like the arrival of Google, the iPhone or ChatGPT: a section shift.
Collapse of the Previous Ecosystem (Twenties–Thirties) Between 1900 and 1930 U.S. horse inhabitants fell from 21 million to 10 million and the carriage and buggy manufacturing plummeted. New infrastructure—roads, fuel stations, driver licensing, visitors legal guidelines—was constructed across the automotive, not the horse.
Early automakers borrowed closely from carriage design (1885–1910). Automobiles emerged in a world dominated by horse-drawn automobiles and so they inherited the supplies and mechanical designs from the coach builders.
– Leaf springs had been the dominant suspension in Nineteenth-century carriages. Early automobiles used the identical.
– There have been no shock absorbers in carriages, and early autos. They each relied on leaf spring damping, making them bouncy and unstable at pace. Why? Roads had been horrible. Speeds had been low. Coachbuilders understood easy methods to make wagons survive cobblestones and grime.
– Carriages used strong metal or picket axles; early automobiles did the identical.
Physique Building and Design Borrowed from Carriages
– Automotive our bodies had been wooden framed with metal or aluminum sheathing, like a carriage.
– Upholstery, leatherwork, and ornamentation had been additionally carried over.
– Phrases like roadster, phaeton, landaulet, and brougham are instantly inherited from carriage varieties.
– Excessive seating and slender monitor: Early automobiles had tall wheels and excessive floor clearance, like buggies and carriages, since early roads had been rutted and muddy.
End result: Early vehicles regarded like carriages with out the horse, as a result of they had been, functionally and structurally, carriages with engines bolted on.
What Modified Over Time
As speeds elevated and roads improved, wooden carriage design couldn’t deal with the torsional stress of quicker, heavier automobiles. Leaf-spring suspensions had been too crude for pace and dealing with. Automotive builders started utilizing pressed metal our bodies (Fisher Physique’s breakthrough), impartial entrance suspension (launched within the Thirties), lastly integrating the automotive physique and chassis right into a single, unified construction, somewhat than having a separate physique and body (within the Thirties–40s).
Studebaker: From Horses to Horsepower
The one carriage maker who didn’t exit of enterprise and have become an car firm was Studebaker. Based in 1852 in South Bend, IN, Studebaker started by constructing wagons for farmers and pioneers heading west. They provided wagons to the Union Military in the course of the Civil Conflict and have become the biggest wagon producer on the planet by the late Nineteenth century. However in contrast to its friends, Studebaker made a sequence of early, strategic bets on the longer term.
In 1902, they started producing electrical automobiles—a cautious however forward-thinking transfer. Two years later, in 1904, they entered the gasoline automotive enterprise, at first by contracting out the engine and chassis. Finally, they started making all the automotive themselves.
Studebaker understood two issues the opposite 4,000 carriage firms ignored:
- The long run wouldn’t be horse-drawn.
- The corporate’s core functionality wasn’t in carriages—it was in mobility.
Studebaker made the painful shift in manufacturing, retooled their factories, and retrained their workforce. By the 1910s, they had been a full-fledged automotive firm.
Studebaker survived lengthy into the auto age—longer than a lot of the early automakers—and solely stopped making automobiles in 1966.
Fisher Physique: A Coach Builder for the Machine Age
Whereas Studebaker made a direct pivot of their total firm from carriage to automobiles, a case may be made that Fisher Physique was a by-product. Based in 1908 in Detroit by brothers Fred and Charles Fisher, the Fishers had labored at a carriage agency earlier than beginning their very own auto-body enterprise. They specialised in producing the automotive our bodies, not a whole automotive. Their key innovation was making closed metal automotive our bodies which was a significant enchancment over open carriages and wooden frames. By 1919, Fisher was so profitable that Normal Motors purchased a controlling stake and in 1926, GM acquired them totally. For many years, “Physique by Fisher” was stamped into tens of millions of GM automobiles.
Durant-Dort: The Origin of Normal Motors
Whereas the Durant-Dort Carriage Firm by no means made automobiles itself, its co-founder William C. (Billy) Durant noticed what others didn’t. See the weblog posts on Durant’s adventures right here and right here. 
Durant used the fortune he made in carriages to put money into the burgeoning auto business. He based Buick in 1904 and in 1908 arrange Normal Motors. Appearing like one in every of Silicon Valley’s loopy entrepreneurs, he quickly acquired Oldsmobile, Cadillac, and 11 different automotive firms and 10 components/accent firms, creating the primary auto conglomerate. (In 1910 Durant could be fired by his board. Undeterred, Durant based Chevrolet, took it public and in 1916 did a hostile takeover of GM and fired the board. He obtained thrown out once more by his new board in 1920 and died penniless managing a bowling alley.)
Whereas his monetary overreach ultimately price him management of GM, his imaginative and prescient reshaped American manufacturing. Normal Motors grew to become the biggest automotive firm within the 20th century.
Why the Different 3,999 Carriage makers Didn’t Make It
Most carriage makers didn’t have a William Durant, a Fisher brother, or a Studebaker within the boardroom. Right here’s why they failed:
- Technological Discontinuity
- Carriages had been manufactured from wooden, leather-based, and iron; automobiles required metal, engines, electrical methods. The abilities didn’t switch simply.
- Capital Necessities
- Retooling for automobiles required big funding. Most small and midsize carriage corporations didn’t have the cash—or couldn’t increase it in time.
- Enterprise Mannequin Inertia
- Carriage makers offered low-volume, high-margin merchandise. The automotive enterprise, particularly after Ford’s Mannequin T, was about high-volume, low-margin scale.
- Cultural Identification
- Carriage builders didn’t see themselves as engineers or industrialists. They had been artisans. Automobiles had been noisy, soiled machines—beneath them.
- Managers versus visionary founders
- In every of the three firms that survived, it was the founders, not employed CEOs that drove the transition.
- Underestimating the adoption curve
- Early automobiles had been unhealthy. However technological S-curves bend rapidly. By the 1910s, automobiles had been clearly higher. And by the Twenties, the carriage was out of date.
- How did you go bankrupt? “Two methods. Regularly, then abruptly.”
By 1925, out of the 4,000+ carriage firms in operation round 1900, practically all had been gone.
The tragedy of the carriage period and classes for immediately
What does an early 20th century disruption should do with AI and immediately’s firms? Lots. The teachings are timeless and related for immediately’s CEOs and boards.
It wasn’t simply that carriage firms didn’t pivot. It’s that that they had time and clients—and nonetheless missed it. That very same sample occurs at each disruptive transition; they had been led by CEOs who merely couldn’t think about a distinct world than the one that they had mastered. (This occurred when firms needed to grasp the online, cellular and social media, and is repeating immediately with AI.)
Carriage firm Presidents had been tied to gross sales and growing income. The risk to their enterprise from automobiles appeared far sooner or later. That was true for 20 years till the underside dropped out of their market with the speedy adoption of autos, with the introduction of the Ford Mannequin T. At the moment, CEO compensation is tied to quarterly earnings, not long-term reinvention. Most boards are full of risk-averse fiduciaries, not builders or technologists. They reward share buybacks, not AI moonshots. The actual downside isn’t that firms can’t see the longer term. It’s that they’re structurally disincentivized to behave on it. In the meantime, disruption doesn’t look forward to board approval.
In case you’re a CEO, you’re not simply managing a P&L. You might be deciding whether or not your organization would be the Studebaker—or one of many different 3,999.
Filed underneath: Company/Gov’t Innovation |
